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MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002
This paper provides an overview of economic developments and the
conduct of monetary policy in interwar Japan, while considering 
the relationships of these fluctuations and policies to changes in the
monetary regime. To this end, monetary policies under the respective
monetary regimes are discussed by using the Taylor rule, which has
recently been widely applied to evaluations of monetary policy. The
analyses in this paper reveal that Japan’s monetary policy from the
gold standard era through the interwar period generally worked in
a pro-cyclical manner in relation to inflation rates, though influ-
enced by the choice of monetary regimes. Domestic economic stabil-
ity was sacrificed in the conduct of monetary policy to attain
exchange rate targets under the gold standard system before World
War I (WWI) and under the managed floating system in the 1920s.
Although more effective monetary policy designed to stabilize the
domestic economy might have been realized after the departure from
the gold standard, such policies were not actually carried out.
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system; Interwar economy; Taylor ruleI. Introduction
Some observers compare the stagnant economic conditions of Japan since the 1990s to
the economic situation in the 1920s, when Japan experienced cycles of short-term 
business recovery and turbulence in the financial system. Also, some argue that an 
economic stimulus package promoted in the early 1930s at the initiative of Finance
Minister Korekiyo Takahashi (the so-called Takahashi Economic Policy) led the
Japanese economy to relatively early recovery, and suggest that similar policies might 
be effectively applied to present-day Japan. However, to properly review the economic
conditions and policy responses in the interwar period (from the 1920s through the
1930s), one should examine them from a multidimensional point of view, taking into
account influences of the drastic changes in domestic and overseas economic conditions
triggered by World War I (WWI), and changes in the monetary regime such as 
turbulence in the gold standard system and the departure from the gold standard.
This study attempts to provide an overview of interwar economic developments
and conduct of monetary policy in Japan, while devoting proper attention to the
relationships of these fluctuations and operations to changes in the monetary regime.
The conduct of monetary policy under the respective monetary regimes are discussed
by using the Taylor rule, which has recently been widely applied to the evaluation of
monetary policies. 
This paper is comprised of the following sections. Section II discusses economic
developments during the interwar period (from the 1920s through the 1930s) in
Japan, with due consideration given to past studies. Section III reviews Japan’s mone-
tary policy from the period of the gold standard system through the interwar period
in connection with changing monetary regimes. Section IV investigates changes in
monetary policy rules in the long run based on the Taylor rule. Finally, Section V
presents and discusses implications of the results. In the appendices, the behavior 
of monetary indicators are reviewed mainly for the interwar period, followed by a 
preliminary study of the characteristics of the interwar economy from the viewpoint
of price fluctuations and economic growth, in connection with the interactions
between structural adjustments in industries and monetary policy.
II. Economic Developments from WWI through the Interwar
Period in Japan
This section reviews basic data on long-term economic developments in Japan, just
before and during the interwar period. Table 1indicates changes in real GNP and prices
(GNP deflator) from 1886 to 1940, based on data from Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and
Yamamoto (1974). Throughout the period, real GNP grew at an average of 
3.3 percent, and the GNP deflator increased at an average of 3.8 percent. In the 
second half of the 1910s (that is, roughly corresponding to the duration of WWI), 
real GNP grew by as much as 6 percent annually, while the GNP deflator showed high
inflation with an average annual rate of 19 percent. During this period, the standard
deviation for the percentage change in the GNP deflator also showed high values (above
78 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002nine), indicating drastic fluctuations in prices. In contrast, throughout the 1920s, real
GNP grew modestly, at an average of 2 percent annually, and on average the GNP defla-
tor change was negative. During this period, the standard deviations of the percentage
changes both in real GNP and in the GNP deflator fell toward the late 1920s.
1 In the
79
Economic Developments and Monetary Policy Responses in Interwar Japan: Evaluation Based on the Taylor Rule
1. Some observers emphasize the deflationary characteristics of the Japanese economy in the 1920s with a downward
trend of prices; others, however, regard this period as a stabilizing period, albeit with low growth. We shall discuss
this point later in this section.
Table 1  Nominal and Real GNP and GNP Deflator in Japan
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Source: Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974).





















1885 806 — — 3,852 — — 20.9  — —
1886–90 1,056 5.6  4.43  4,583 3.5  3.57  23.0  1.9  7.09 
1891–95 1,552 8.0  5.76  5,798 4.8  3.74  26.8  3.1  4.22 
1896–1900 2,414 9.2  4.86  6,232 1.5  3.28  38.7  7.6  6.53 
1901–05 3,084 5.0  3.94  6,769 1.7  5.28  45.6  3.3  2.77 
1906–10 3,925 4.9  4.82  7,834 3.0  2.27  50.1  1.9  5.22 
1911–15 4,991 4.9  6.16  8,527 1.7  2.06  58.5  3.1  6.34 
1916–20 15,896 26.1  13.33  11,422  6.0  3.57  139.2  18.9  9.46 
1921–25 16,265 0.5  4.82 12,332 1.5  6.61  131.9 –1.1  7.83 
1926–30 14,671 –2.0  4.24  13,882  2.4  2.27  105.7  –4.3  3.52 
1931–35 18,298 4.5  7.78 18,366 5.8  3.40  99.6 –1.2  4.54 
1936–40 36,851 15.0  4.86  22,848  4.5  1.52  161.3  10.1  3.49 
Total average 7.2  9.80  3.3  4.04  3.8  8.50
Note: The real GNP is standardized according to the 1934–36 level; the average for the 1934–36 GNP deflator is set at 100. first half of the 1930s (a period characterized by the lifting of the gold embargo 
from 1930–31, followed by the Takahashi Economic Policy), real GNP again rose at 
6 percent, yet the GNP deflator remained slightly negative. In the latter half of the
1930s, growth slowed to 4 percent, but the GNP deflator turned upward at an annual
rate of 10 percent. During the 1930s, the standard deviations of the percentage changes 
both in real GNP and in the GNP deflator remained relatively small.
The boom experienced in and after WWI and the subsequent recurring short-
term economic recoveries and depressions could be regarded as one of the greatest
economic upheavals in the modern Japanese economy, in terms of both business
cycles and structural changes. The Japanese economy during the interwar period has
already been extensively studied.
2 In the following subsections, basic facts about the
Japanese economy from WWI through the interwar period will be summarized for
four periods: (1) the WWI boom, (2) the 1920s, (3) the lifting of the gold embargo,
and (4) the reinstatement of the gold embargo (departure from the gold standard),
following Nakamura and Odaka (1989) and Nakamura (1989).
3
A. The WWI Boom
WWI prompted rapid industrialization associated with the export-driven economic
expansion, and also witnessed improvements in the industrial infrastructure such as
electricity, railroads, marine transportation, and so on. 
Exports to Asia and North America increased significantly, especially of light
industrial items with relatively high export competitiveness (e.g., textiles). In addi-
tion, import substitutions in heavy industry (e.g., metals and machinery) proceeded,
and some items in these areas even became export products. The industrialization
process was accompanied by improvements in the industrial infrastructure such as
electricity, railroads, and communication equipment. The marine transportation
industry grew to support overseas trade, and the shipbuilding industry also developed
to support marine transportation. During the war, world prices for both agricultural
products and industrial items rose sharply, leading to a 3.5-fold increase in domestic
wholesale prices from the end of 1914 through March 1920. 
These conditions stimulated an economic expansion in rural areas as well as 
in cities. On the other hand, severe inflation depressed the real wages of laborers,
triggering rice riots in August 1918, and posing a major social problem. Following a
temporary business setback after the end of WWI, the lifting of the gold embargo in
the United States in June 1919 prompted a massive inflow of funds into Japan; this
was the result of the wartime current account surplus that was converted into gold in
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2. For past surveys in Japanese, refer, for example, to Nakamura and Odaka (1989) and Nakamura (1989). There are
few English-language documents on the interwar Japanese economy; Patrick (1971) has commented that the 
economic policy in the 1920s, preparing for the lifting of the gold embargo at the old parity, had an excessively
deflationary effect on the domestic economy. On the other hand, Nakamura (1983) has stressed the growth led by
domestic demand, achieving heavy industrialization, chemical industrialization, and urbanization throughout the
interwar period, though he does not deny deflationary pressures in this period. In terms of the economic recovery
during the period of the Takahashi Economic Policy, Nanto and Takagi (1985) and Okura and Teranishi (1994)
stress the effects of the increase of exports accompanying the depreciation of the yen.
3. Nakamura (1989) divides the Japanese economy from 1914 to 1936, or from the outbreak of WWI to the eve of
the Sino-Japanese War, into the four phases of the WWI boom, the deflationary period in the 1920s, the period 
of the worldwide Great Depression in the early 1930s, and the period of recovery and growth after 1932 or the era
of the Takahashi Economic Policy.the United States after June 1919. These funds supported brisk business investment
including speculative inventory investments and private consumption, fueling
domestic demand. Further, economic recovery in Europe added external demand.
These conditions contributed to an overheating of the economy. Junnosuke Inoue,
then the Bank of Japan (BOJ) Governor, referred to it as the “false boom.”
4
B. The 1920s
In 1920, exports turned downward abruptly, triggering a repercussive depression 
in March, and prices began declining after a peak in March. Clear indications of
recession became noticeable, particularly in rural areas. Tsuchiya (1968) characterized
the Japanese economy in the 1920s as being in “chronic recession.” Further, the
Great Kanto Earthquake in September 1923 and the financial crisis from March to
May 1927, among other events, triggered recurring turmoil in the financial system,
to which the BOJ responded with a series of relief loans. 
On the other hand, business restructuring through mergers was briskly pursued in
various industries such as the electricity, railroad, spinning, and fertilizer sectors.
Both new establishment/capital increases and dissolution/capital reductions were at
high levels in this period.
5 Growth continued in such fields as machinery, metals, 
and chemicals, accelerating the impetus toward heavy and chemical industrialization.
As a result, changes in real GNP were positive in many years during this period 
and real GNP in 1930 exceeded the level in 1920 by 22 percent; at the same time,
prices declined steadily. Urbanization accelerated along with drastic changes in the
industrial structure. 
Based on these findings, Nakamura (1989) concluded that the Japanese economy
in the 1920s should not be regarded as suffering across-the-board recession, but that
it should instead be characterized by “unbalanced growth” led by domestic demand
centering on investments in business capital and infrastructure. In other words, while
the Japanese economy was subject to repeated short-term recoveries and recessions in
the 1920s, the overall picture indicated mild economic growth, in which the growth
rates in urban and rural areas diverged. 
On the international scene, the United States and European countries returned to
the gold standard one after another. However, as current account deficits persisted,
many observers at that time viewed the lifting of the gold embargo as premature in
Japan. The Japanese government thus did not dare to do so.
Within these economic conditions, there were heated discussions on the lifting of
the gold embargo among policymakers, economists, business people, academics, and
the general public. The causes of economic fluctuations and proposed countermeasures
drew the attention not only of policymakers and researchers, but also of the public 
as a whole. The wide range of economic policy debates was partly attributable to 
changing political and social conditions (the so-called Taisho Democracy) with the
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4. Inoue referred to it as a groundless economic fever brought about by large-scale speculations centering on stock
and commodity markets, using the metaphor of “burning a field in early winter by igniting a small fire that
spreads rapidly in the wind.” Refer to Inoue (1925, p. 28); Tanaka (1980, p. 6); and the Committee for
Compiling the One-Hundred-Year History of the Bank of Japan (1983a, pp. 504–510).
5. Refer to Nakamura (1989, p. 296).establishment of party politics, and to the emergence of new forms of media such 
as economic newspapers and magazines. While policy discussions in the 1920s were
diversified, they converged into a “debate over the lifting of the gold embargo” by the
end of the 1920s, when the gold embargo was finally lifted.
6
While a dualistic simplification may not be appropriate as the arguments changed
along with economic conditions, policy arguments during this period can be roughly
divided into two categories. One was the pillar of the argument that emphasized
structural reforms to maintain external competitiveness under the gold standard 
system, while another emphasized the stability of the domestic economy.
7 Those in
the former position favored the “lifting of the gold embargo at the old parity” with
confidence in the gold standard as an international monetary regime. They intended
to “reorganize the business community” by selecting competitive companies and
deflating domestic prices to the same levels as in the United Kingdom and the
United States. Among them, Sanji Muto, president of the Kanebo Textile Company,
advocated the immediate lifting of the gold embargo as early as 1922.
8 Most of his
peers in business, bureaucracy, and financial circles preferred a period of preparation
before lifting the gold embargo, and waiting until conditions were right before 
implementing it. Those in the latter position argued that the lifting of the gold
embargo at the old parity would have a significant deflationary impact on the 
domestic economy. They emphasized the stability of the domestic economy, contend-
ing that the gold embargo should not be lifted immediately, or that the embargo
should be lifted at a new gold parity (i.e., a new exchange rate) with a depreciated
yen reflecting price differences between the domestic and the overseas markets.
Naokichi Kaneko, the head clerk of Suzuki Shoten, which went bankrupt in the
financial crisis of 1927, had strongly opposed the lifting of the embargo in 1922.
Tanzan Ishibashi, Kamekichi Takahashi, and others affiliated with Toyo Keizai
Shimposha (publisher of a prominent economic journal) began advocating the lifting
of the embargo at a new parity in around 1924.
It is thought that the document History of the Lifting of the Gold Embargo (1),
reprinted by the BOJ (1968a), was originally compiled by the BOJ staff in 1932–33.
The document suggests that although the BOJ consistently set as one of its policy
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6. Concerning the debate over the lifting of the gold embargo, the BOJ (1968a), (1968c), and (1969) has prepared
comprehensive lists of contemporary documents. Also refer to Tanaka (1980, pp. 104–129), Cho (1983), the
Committee for Compiling the One-Hundred-Year History of the Bank of Japan (1983b, pp. 126–168 and 
pp. 380–392), Nakamura (1978, pp. 39–46, and 1989, pp. 290–305), and Ito (1989, pp. 133–146).
7. Nakamura (1978) classifies the arguments on the lifting of the gold embargo into three types: “lifting at the old
parity,” “lifting at the new parity,” and “opposing lifting,” and comments that the argument of “lifting at the old
parity” versus “opposing the lifting” in the early stages was transformed to that of “lifting at the old parity” versus
“lifting at the new parity.” Cho (1983) utilizes internal Ministry of Finance documents to contrast “lifting at the
old parity” with opposition to it in around 1924, and with “lifting at the new parity” in around 1929. Tanaka
(1980) discusses “lifting at the old parity” from the standpoint of international cooperation. Ito (1989) also argues
that the “lifting at the old parity” policy was consistent with the interests of Western investors, as well as of the
Japanese government. He pointed out that the Western investors wanted to secure stable investment sites in Japan,
and that the Japanese government had strong concerns about the confidence of overseas investors for the smooth
refunding of existing foreign debts in the near future. Ito (1989) also comments that “it was the depletion of
specie money, which had been kept abroad, that finally paved the way toward the lifting of the gold embargo.” He
then emphasizes the government’s concerns about external finance, that is to say, specie reserve requirements, as
the background of Japan’s formulation of a policy of lifting the gold embargo. Refer to Tanaka (1980, p. 107) and
Ito (1989, pp. 134–137, pp. 147–151, and p. 213).
8. Refer to Nakamura (1978, pp. 39–46).goals the “reorganization of the business community” (that is, let the weak companies
fail), geared toward lifting of the gold embargo, the BOJ was in fact forced to adopt
relief loans as its central policy instrument to respond to turmoil in the financial 
system. In this situation, Junnosuke Inoue became Governor of the BOJ from 1919
to 1923 and again from 1927 to 1928, and Finance Minister in 1923 (immediately
after the Great Kanto Earthquake) and again from 1929 to 1931, leading to his 
significant influence on financial and monetary policies. Inoue intended to make
Japan the hub of the international financial market in Asia, or the “London of 
the East.” With an eye to returning to the gold standard system after sufficient 
preparation, he was reported to have advocated strongly the enhancement of compet-
itiveness of domestic industries through “reorganization of the business community”
as a prerequisite. In the end, he played a central role in lifting the gold embargo in
the early 1930s.
9
Eigo Fukai was appointed BOJ Executive Director in the 1920s, and served as
Deputy Governor and Governor during the period of the Takahashi Economic
Policy. His views on monetary regimes were rather different from those expressed by
Inoue. In a series of works including A Thesis on Monetary Management (1928) and
Reflections on Seventy Years (1941), he wrote that although it had some merits the
gold standard system was merely one of several possible monetary regimes (including
a fiat money system). He contended that monetary regimes should be adopted 
flexibly as economic conditions changed.
10 His view of placing the gold standard 
system in a relative context was consistent with his evaluation of the Takahashi
Economic Policy. One of his books, published in 1938 (Monetary Policy after the
Departure from the Gold Standard System), supported an expansionary fiscal policy, 
a departure from the gold standard system, and the underwriting of government
bonds by the BOJ, although he recognized the danger of future inflation if this policy
was followed.
11
C. The Period during Which the Gold Embargo Was Lifted
Junnosuke Inoue took office as Finance Minister for the Hamaguchi Cabinet of 
the Minsei Party, which had made lifting the gold embargo a part of its election 
platform. He implemented an austere fiscal policy (the so-called Inoue Economic
Policy), and finally lifted the gold embargo on January 11, 1930. Between his coming
to office and the lifting of the embargo, stock prices on the New York Stock
Exchange had plummeted in October 1929 (“Black Thursday”), triggering the Great
Depression around the globe.
12 The lifting of the gold embargo further deflated the
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9. In this context, the Committee for Compiling the One-Hundred-Year History of the Bank of Japan (1983b)
points out that Inoue was regarded as advocating prudence in lifting the gold embargo when he became Finance
Minister in the Hamaguchi Cabinet in 1929, and states that “viewing Inoue before that as opposing the lifting of
the gold embargo does not do him justice.” Refer to Tanaka (1980, pp. 52–55 and pp. 114–119), and to the
Committee for Compiling the One-Hundred-Year History of the Bank of Japan (1983b, p. 148 and p. 381).
Fukai points out that Inoue, when Governor of the BOJ, funded relief loans for the private sector, and that this
delayed the structural reforms necessary for lifting the gold embargo. Refer to Fukai (1941, pp. 197–199) and
Nakamura (1978, pp. 67–69).
10. For example, refer to Fukai (1928, pp. 194–200, 1941, p. 240).
11. Refer to Fukai (1938, pp. 359–364) and Cho (1983).
12. Many studies are available on the Great Depression. Refer to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Kindleberger
(1982), Bernstein (1991), Temin (1994), and Bernanke (2000).Japanese economy, and domestic wholesale prices fell by more than 30 percent in less
than two years (from December 1929 to October 1931). Although the United States
maintained the gold standard system until April 1933, the United Kingdom stopped
its conversion to gold in September 1931, followed by gold embargoes in Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, and by the introduction of foreign exchange 
controls in Italy and other countries. Under these circumstances, investors sold yen in
anticipation of the reinstatement of the gold embargo in Japan, and this accelerated
the outflow of specie.
D. After the Reinstatement of the Gold Embargo (The Departure from the Gold
Standard System)
Korekiyo Takahashi was appointed Finance Minister in the Inukai Cabinet of 
the Seiyukai Party in December 1931, and implemented the gold embargo on 
the day of his appointment. Takahashi adopted a three-pronged policy called the
Takahashi Economic Policy early during his time in office. These were an exchange
rate policy featuring the free depreciation of the yen, expansion of fiscal expenditures
funded by government bonds underwritten by the BOJ, and lowering of interest
rates. As a result, the economy recovered, accelerating the industrialization that was
already underway in the 1920s. Along with these measures, he instituted regulation
of financial and industrial activities, gradually moving toward a command economy.
At the first stage of the Takahashi Economic Policy, the BOJ absorbed the 
funds from the domestic financial market by selling government bonds to financial
institutions. However, as industrial production neared full capacity by the latter 
half of 1935, the private sector’s demand for funds to expand capacity increased.
Accordingly, the BOJ found it increasingly difficult to sell government bonds to
financial institutions. On advice from Fukai, Takahashi urged reductions in military
spending and in deficit-covering bonds during the formation of the fiscal 1936 
budget, which brought him into conflict with the military. Takahashi was thus 
assassinated in the attempted coup d’état on February 26, 1936. Following this 
incident, the issuance of government bonds grew out of control, and this led to
hyperinflation after World War II (WWII).
13
III. Monetary Policy in the Interwar Period of Japan
In this section, monetary policy in Japan during the interwar period is reviewed in
connection with changing monetary regimes, which are closely linked to the issues
addressed in Section IV. The policies are then discussed in relation to the “rules of the
game” of the gold standard, which had continued from 1897 (immediately following
the Sino-Japanese War) until 1917 (the middle of WWI) and had been readopted in
1930–31. Finally, a survey is presented of the external economic conditions in which
these policies were conducted.
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13. For more information on the historical background, refer to Shizume (2001) and Ide (2001).A. Relationship to the Monetary Regime
In the relationship between the choice of the monetary regime of a country and its
macroeconomic policy, there exists a “macroeconomic policy trilemma of an open
economy.”
14 The idea is that one cannot simultaneously achieve all three conditions
among exchange rate stabilization, stability of the domestic economy (or monetary
policy autonomy), and free flow of capital. To summarize the monetary policy in
Japan during the interwar period in terms of the monetary regime, the gold standard
system was in place that, prior to WWI, consisted of a fixed-rate system based on 
the free flow of capital. It gave priority to the stabilization of exchange rates and free
flow of capital at the cost of the stability of the domestic economy. From wartime
through the immediate postwar period (when the gold embargo was implemented), 
it had been desirable to adopt a tight monetary policy to stabilize the domestic 
economy. But in reality, a large increase in the money supply led to inflation amid
significant international price increases, in accordance with the “rules of the game” of
the gold standard. 
In the 1920s, the government set a target of restoring the prewar exchange rate
with an eye toward lifting the gold embargo at the old parity. However, as exchange
rates fluctuated in a de facto gold embargo, the monetary policy operated with some
consideration for the stabilization of the domestic economy. In other words, although
the policymakers set the target of realizing stabilization of exchange rates and free
flow of capital in the long run, they sacrificed exchange rate stability in the short
term in favor of stability of the domestic economy. This policy stance may be
regarded as a sort of managed floating-rate system. In this regard, one observer has
commented that “the BOJ was able to become a relief organization because it had
effectively continued to halt the conversion of bank notes to gold since the gold
embargo was introduced in 1917. Moreover, this was because the government 
prevented the exchange rate from falling by selling specie money despite the fact 
that imports continued to exceed exports while gold conversion had been halted.”
15
A number of previous studies observed that the economy was supported to some
extent by monetary relaxation in the 1920s, especially in the latter half of the decade.
It was also said that “while the business community spent gloomy days under 
threatening skies, the government and the BOJ tried to prevent major bankruptcies
with loans from the Deposit Bureau and with the BOJ’s Special Loans. These 
efforts kept overall economic conditions from suffering major setbacks, while some
individual banks or companies could have faced crises.”
16
In 1930–31, Japan lifted the gold embargo and returned to the gold standard.
However, the nation faced a harsh outflow of specie money due to the abandonment 
of the gold standard by the United Kingdom, and implemented the gold embargo
85
Economic Developments and Monetary Policy Responses in Interwar Japan: Evaluation Based on the Taylor Rule
14. For more discussion on the trilemma of an open economy, refer to Obstfeld and Taylor (1997).
15. Tanaka (1980, p. 37).
16. Nakamura (1989, pp. 296–297). This view leads to the conclusion that the BOJ had become a relief organi-
zation. Ito (1989, 2001) points out that due to the malfunction of the financial intermediary, the effects of 
the relaxation did not necessarily spread throughout the entire economy; Ito applies the expression “abnormal
financial slack” to the relaxation phase following the financial crisis of 1927. Refer to Fukai (1941, pp. 194–200),
Tanaka (1980, pp. 24–37), Teranishi (1989, pp. 205–208) and Ito (1989, pp. 197–215).again at the end of 1931, marking the eventual departure from the gold standard 
to the fiat money system. In the first half of 1932, the yen was depreciated to give
priority to stability of the domestic economy, sacrificing stabilization of exchange
rates, while maintaining the free flow of capital. Later, new controls over currency
and capital flow were implemented through the enforcement of the Capital 
Flight Prevention Law in July 1932, the Foreign Exchange Control Law in May
1933, and the Import-Exchange Bill Control Ordinance in January 1937. In relation
to the monetary regime, Japan thus entered a controlled economy phase, aiming 
at the stability of exchange rates and the domestic economy at the cost of free 
flow of capital.
17
B. Relationship to the “Rules of the Game” of the Gold Standard
Many studies have been conducted on the so-called “rules of the game” of the 
gold standard; i.e., the formulation and implementation of monetary policy under
the gold standard system. For example, Amano (1980) cites two conditions for the
establishment of an international gold standard system. These conditions are that the
monetary authorities of each country accept unlimited sales and purchases of gold at
a certain price expressed in the country’s currency (gold parity), and that domestic
and international gold trades can be conducted freely. If these conditions are met, 
he points out, exchange rates fluctuate within a narrow range (with the lower limit 
at gold parity minus the import cost of gold and the upper limit at gold parity 
plus the export cost of gold), thus achieving a fixed exchange rate system without
governmental intervention in foreign exchange markets. Furthermore, the actual
international gold standard system was managed under the system’s “rules of the
game,” or more specifically, under the condition that the “monetary authorities of
each country increase or decrease money supply in accordance with increases or
decreases in that country’s gold reserve.”
18
The classical theory of the quantity of money assumes that automatic adjustment
of the trade balance works if each country implements the “rules of the game” of the
gold standard and maintains a commitment to a fixed exchange rate for long
periods.
19 If prices go up in Country A due to a domestic shock, gold will flow out of
the country, with an increase in imports and a decrease in exports. This will reduce
the gold reserves held by the monetary authorities of the country. In response, the
monetary authorities reduce currency in circulation, which pushes prices down. And
conversely, if prices go down, the authorities increase currency, pushing prices up.
From the point of view of another country (Country B), the domestic shock in
Country A will affect the currency circulation of Country B through international
transfers of specie money, triggered by a temporary imbalance in trade. This leads to
worldwide price equality for identical commodities in the long run. If each country
operates monetary policy in accordance with these “rules of the game,” prices in 
all countries around the world will remain stable, and temporary current account
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17. For more information on these circumstances, refer to Ito (1989, pp. 261–278).
18. Refer to Amano (1980, p. 240).
19. This mechanism was first explained in a comprehensive manner by David Hume and elaborated and completed
in the form of a classical international trade theory by David Ricardo. Refer to Harui (1991, pp. 28–38).imbalances will be resolved easily, except in the case of major fluctuations in gold
output, but they will affect currency circulation worldwide.
20
The international gold standard system was predominant from the latter half of
the 19th century to the early 20th century. But whether or not each country imple-
mented its policy in accordance with the “rules of the game” of the gold standard has
been questioned.
21 A number of studies suggest that the monetary authorities of
countries did not automatically adjust currency circulation to respond to fluctuations
in gold reserves. Rather, they might have conducted somewhat discretionary policies,
changing discount rates and intervening in the gold market, as long as the gold
reserves fluctuated within a certain range.
The writings of the officials concerned and bank documents indicate that the
BOJ actually operated on official discount rates to stabilize the domestic economy
within the constraints of gold reserves required under the gold standard system.
22
However, as explained later, the BOJ policy under the gold standard system did not
seem to work successfully to alleviate domestic economic fluctuations (i.e., it did not
appear to be counter-cyclical). Table 2 indicates monthly dynamic cross-correlations
between wholesale prices (percentage change over the previous year) and the discount
rate levels. For the period between 1899 and 1914, roughly corresponding to the
period of the gold standard, the correlation coefficient was negative where the time
difference was zero. Although the correlation coefficient does not suggest any cause-
and-effect relationship between the variables, it is natural to assume that monetary
policies during this period were conducted in consideration of targets other than
price levels (e.g., the stabilization of exchange rates). Section III.C discusses in detail
the ways in which operations were focused on how to respond effectively to overseas
economic conditions. Furthermore, from WWI to the postwar period (1915–20), a
negative correlation is indicated where the time difference is zero, which means that
interest rates were lowered amid rising inflation rates.
In contrast, in 1922–28, the correlation coefficient with no time difference is 
positive, and the discount rate marked the highest correlation five months prior to
the inflation rate. This may suggest that the BOJ had adopted a counter-cyclical 
policy under the gold embargo. Further, stabilization of the domestic economy may
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20. In terms of the automatic adjustment mechanism in the gold standard system, the British Committee on
Currency and Foreign Exchanges after the War (Cunliffe Committee) (1918, 1919) compiled an interim report
in 1918 and a final report in 1919. They insisted that international capital movements prompted by the interest
rate policy of central banks provided automatic-adjustment functions as an alternative to the current account 
balance, and that the United Kingdom should immediately return to the gold standard system after WWI. On
the other hand, the Committee on Finance and Industry (MacMillan Committee) (1931) issued its own report
in 1931. Keynes and others participated in this report, stating that the automatic adjustment mechanism of the
gold standard did not function in the United Kingdom at that time because of downward rigidity in wages.
21. Refer to Bloomfield (1975, pp. 56–61), McKinnon (1994, pp. 54–57), and Harui (1991, pp. 128–134).
Teranishi and Uchino (1986) undertake an empirical analysis of monetary policy in Japan from 1898–1914,
when the gold standard system was in effect. They point out that, if one looks at the numerical data, the BOJ
does not seem to follow the “rules of the game” of the gold standard. But they also indicate the need for further
analyses, including analysis into implementation of monetary policy and the transmission mechanisms of these
policies through the markets of tangible goods, services, and assets.
22. Refer to the Committee for Compiling the One-Hundred-Year History of the Bank of Japan (1983a, 
pp. 240–249 and pp. 260–276). Tanaka (1980) also reports that the BOJ utilized not only discount rate 
operations but also such means as changing screening criteria for eligible bills and changeover of bills to be 
subject to market operations. For more details on this issue, refer to Tanaka (1980, pp. 15–39).88 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002
Dynamic cross-correlation of wholesale-price percentage change
from the previous year and official discount rate
















[Reference] Wholesale prices, official discount rate, and discount rate for commercial bills
1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940
Wholesale price percentage change from the previous year (left scale)
Official discount rate (right scale)






Year 1893–1938 1893–96 1899–1914 1916–20 1922–28 1930–31 1932–39
Preceding 
price
–12 –0.055  –0.111 0.249  –0.022 0.108  –0.171  –0.593 
–11 –0.065  –0.219 0.242  –0.014 0.133  –0.073  –0.583 
–10 –0.076  –0.292 0.230 0.004 0.167 0.018  –0.561 
–9 –0.087  –0.355 0.212 0.035 0.210 0.112  –0.536 
–8 –0.094  –0.341 0.185 0.047 0.253 0.182  –0.499 
–7 –0.102  –0.297 0.149 0.032 0.291 0.187  –0.437 
–6 –0.109  –0.124 0.109 0.000 0.310 0.217  –0.375 
–5 –0.117 0.076 0.064  –0.042 0.317 0.371  –0.333 
–4 –0.126 0.202 0.010  –0.073 0.312 0.510  –0.291 
–3 –0.136 0.355  –0.049  –0.107 0.289 0.513  –0.246 
–2 –0.148 0.469  –0.107  –0.161 0.255 0.449  –0.191 
–1 –0.160 0.553  –0.161  –0.230 0.219 0.445  –0.131 
0 –0.172 0.663  –0.211  –0.315 0.173 0.531  –0.067 
1 –0.185 0.655  –0.259  –0.398 0.134 0.649  –0.026 
2 –0.199 0.569  –0.300  –0.473 0.095 0.693  –0.002 
3 –0.210 0.506  –0.339  –0.538 0.063 0.608 0.051 
4 –0.220 0.443  –0.369  –0.590 0.038 0.425 0.128 
5 –0.228 0.450  –0.386  –0.626 0.021 0.285 0.185 
6 –0.233 0.435  –0.391  –0.658  –0.002 0.216 0.248 
7 –0.234 0.384  –0.384  –0.680  –0.022 0.163 0.329 
8 –0.234 0.346  –0.365  –0.703  –0.028 0.250 0.361 
9 –0.232 0.260  –0.342  –0.718  –0.021 0.436 0.358 
10 –0.227 0.228  –0.309  –0.724  –0.004 0.565 0.346 
11 –0.223 0.188  –0.266  –0.722 0.021 0.588 0.288 
12 –0.218 0.197  –0.214  –0.704 0.058 0.549 0.205 
Preceding
interest rate
Note: Shaded areas represent the highest points of correlation.
Sources: Bank of Japan (1987); Committee for Compiling the One-Hundred-Year History of the Bank of
Japan (1986); Ministry of Finance, Reference Book of Financial Matters (annual editions).be regarded as a policy objective, while the monetary regime was transformed from a
fixed exchange rate system into a managed floating-rate system. However, after 1932
the correlation coefficient with a zero time difference was slightly negative. In this
period, the gold standard system was transformed into a fiat money system. In terms
of the monetary regime, it may have been possible to conduct a monetary policy to
stabilize the domestic economy. However, as far as interest rates are concerned, such a
policy does not seem to have been adopted.
C. External Economic Environment (International Correlation in Prices and the
State of the Balance of Payments)
Next, we will examine the international correlation in prices and the balance of 
payments (BOP) from the gold standard period through the interwar period. We will
compare wholesale prices in Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom. These
latter countries comprised Japan’s major trade partners and also adopted the gold 
standard system (Figure 1). Price movements in these countries did not significantly
diverge from 1897 (when Japan introduced the gold standard system) to 1913, partly
because of relative stability of prices in these countries. Real exchange rates—calculated
by the nominal exchange rates (U.S. dollar/yen and sterling/yen) and the wholesale
price figures (Figure 2)—were relatively stable during this period compared with other
periods. However, it could be the fortuitous absence of any major turbulence that 
prevented significant divergence in price fluctuations between countries.
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Against the United Kingdom
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Nominal exchange rate Price fluctuation difference Real exchange rate
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WWI
Sources: Bank of Japan (1987); U.S. Department of Commerce (1989); Mitchell
(1988); Asahi Shimbunsha (1930); Ministry of Finance, Reference Book 
of Financial Matters (annual editions).In 1915, the year after the outbreak of WWI, U.K. prices jumped by more than
20 percent, followed by accelerated price hikes in Japan and in the United States.
Prices peaked in 1920 in all three countries, then plummeted in 1921–22. The price
index (with the reference level in 1913 set at 100) at its peak in 1920 stood at 259 in
Japan, at 221 in the United States, and at 317 in the United Kingdom; in 1922, at
196 in Japan, at 164 in the United Kingdom, and at 139 in the United States. Price
fluctuations followed the same direction for the different countries; however, the
magnitudes of fluctuation were different. In the first half of the 1920s, prices in
Japan remained consistently high compared to those in the United Kingdom and 
the United States. In the meantime, the nominal exchange rate of the yen barely 
fluctuated against the U.S. dollar. As a result, in 1922 the yen had appreciated in real
terms by about 40 percent against the U.S. dollar, and by 20 percent against the
British pound compared to the level in 1913.
Toward the latter half of the 1920s, the yen depreciated slightly in nominal terms
and wholesale prices declined further in Japan than in the United Kingdom or in the
United States, leading to real exchange rate depreciation. As of 1930, when Japan
returned to the gold standard system at the old par value, the yen had appreciated 
by about 10 percent over the 1913 level against the U.S. dollar and the British pound
in real terms.
After the departure from the gold standard system at the end of 1932, the yen
depreciated against the U.S. dollar and the British pound by more than 40 percent
relative to the 1913 level in nominal terms, while import prices increased. In real
terms, the yen decreased by about 20 percent relative to the 1913 level up until
1935–36. Subsequently, the nominal exchange rate remained relatively stable, but
Japanese wholesale prices rose at a higher pace than in the United Kingdom and the
United States, bringing the real exchange rates near levels seen in 1913.
Figure 3 indicates the developments in Japanese international accounts as 
fractions of GNP, showing the movements of the current, capital, and financial
accounts. The financial account refers to the movements in foreign currency and gold
reserves held by the monetary authorities. Until the 1920s, the current account and
the capital account tended to move in opposite directions, and fluctuations in the
current account were largely offset by the movements of the capital account. Thus,
the short-term fluctuations of foreign currency/gold reserves remained small 
compared to the current account fluctuations. Still, current account fluctuations 
were not entirely offset by the capital account, and both the current account and the
foreign currency/gold reserves tended to move in the same direction
23 (with foreign
currency/gold reserves increasing in periods of current account surplus).
More specifically, in 1916–17 (during WWI), a current account surplus of over
10 percent (as a fraction of GNP) was recorded. The accumulated surplus during
1915–19 amounted to ¥3 billion (or US$1.5 billion). Japan, a newly industrialized
country, had expanded its production capacity to respond to rapid increases in
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23. The exception was in 1905, when a large capital account surplus was recorded due to foreign bond issues by the
government to finance the Russo-Japanese War, and accordingly the specie reserves (particularly those held
abroad) were increased.demand during WWI. After the war, deficits persisted from 1920 to 1928.
24 Japan
now faced diminishing international competitiveness because international prices
declined after the wartime boom. The government compensated for the losses by
adopting a policy of supporting its economy by enhancing domestic demand. In the
latter half of the 1920s, domestic prices fell at a greater pace than in the United
Kingdom or the United States and the current account deficit virtually disappeared.
In 1930–31, when the gold embargo was lifted, the capital account, which had 
previously served to stabilize the BOP, was driven into a significant outflow and
paved the way for Japan’s departure from the gold standard system, while the current
account was roughly balanced.
Under these economic conditions, a fervent debate over lifting the gold embargo
took place in the 1920s. As the real exchange rates against the U.K. and U.S. 
currencies were returning to the levels noted prior to WWI, the lifting of the gold
embargo became a viable option in the 1920s. In fact, prior to the actual lifting of
the gold embargo in January 1930, the government was reported to have studied the
possibility of lifting the gold embargo on three occasions: in 1919, 1923, and 1926.
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Current account Capital account Specie increase/decrease
Percent
WWI
Sources: Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974); Yamazawa and Yamamoto
(1978).
24. The current account deficit in 1924 was 4 percent (as a fraction of GNP), and the accumulated deficits until
1928 totaled ¥2.4 billion. These figures indicate that most of the current account surplus accumulated during
WWI dissipated into the subsequent current account deficit.However, lifting the gold embargo in the midst of continued current account 
deficits would have had a deflationary effect on the domestic economy through
shrinkage of the currency, and required “painful reforms.” In light of the domestic
economic disturbances following the repercussive depression (March 1920), the
Great Kanto Earthquake (September 1923), and the financial crisis (March 1927),
the government was reported to have passed up opportunities for lifting the gold
embargo on each occasion.
25
In 1932, following the lifting and reinstatement of the gold embargo in the
immediately prior years, external economic conditions changed drastically. The 
nominal exchange rate against the U.K. and U.S. currencies fell by 40–50 percent,
exceeding the gap in inflation rates and reducing the real exchange rate, contributing
greatly to Japan’s economic recovery in the early stages of the Takahashi Economic
Policy. Still, international trade was affected not only by exchange rates but by
numerous other factors, such as the effects of Japan’s invasion of Asia, the existence 
of tariff/non-tariff barriers, and non-price competitiveness in various industries. In
addition, increased Japanese exports, especially to Asia, provoked political backlashes
abroad, partly because of the intensifying international aversion to Japan’s military
invasions, which paved the way for Japan’s increasing isolation.
IV. Analysis Based on the Taylor Rule
A. Significance of Applying the Taylor Rule to Historical Analyses
As early as 1963, when Friedman and Schwartz discussed the relationship between
the money supply and economic fluctuations in the United States, economists have 
studied monetary policies from extended historical perspectives, covering the period
in which the gold standard system was applied. In Japan too, Asakura and Nishiyama
(1974), Fujino (1994), and others have analyzed the effects of monetary policies on
the real economy based on fluctuations in the money supply. 
More recently, Taylor (1998) argued that past evaluations of monetary policies
could be reinterpreted within the framework of the Taylor rule. Taylor compares
monetary policy rules
26 and the economic conditions in the United States for the 
following periods: (1) 1880–1914 (under the gold standard system), (2) the 1960s–
70s, and (3) after 1987 (the beginning of Alan Greenspan’s tenure as chairman of the
U.S. Federal Reserve Board). Taylor indicates that under the gold standard system
during period (1), interest rates seem to have barely responded to changes in inflation
rates or output gaps with respect to the Taylor rule, and that price levels remained
stable on average but were still quite volatile. He also notes that during period (2),
interest rates became more responsive to inflation rates or output gaps than in the
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25. Refer to Tanaka (1980, pp. 64–81 and pp. 96–103).
26. The Federal Reserve System did not exist when the gold standard system was adopted in the United States. Thus,
strictly speaking, it is doubtful whether any monetary policy was conducted. On this issue, Taylor argues that
interest rates fluctuate regardless of the existence of a central bank, that the Treasury Department served the func-
tion of a central bank to some extent during the period of the gold standard, and that a similar framework could
be applicable to this period. Refer to Taylor (1998, pp. 324–325).gold standard days, but the reactions to inflation rates were smaller than predicted by
the normative Taylor rule; under these circumstances, inflation was accelerated. He
then argues that, compared with past policies, monetary policy in period (3) has been
more responsive to increases in the inflation rate, which has contributed to stabilizing
the economy. He concludes that the Federal Reserve System has drawn policy lessons
from past experience.
Originally, the Taylor rule was advocated as a normative rule to be used to derive
a desirable interest rate in the implementation of monetary policy, with an eye
toward stabilizing the economy.
27 Taylor (1998) further applies the rule as a means of
comparing different monetary policies adopted under different monetary regimes.
This analytical framework may be considered as a useful tool for analyzing monetary
policies in the interwar period in terms of the transition from the gold standard to a
fiat money regime.
28 Regarding Japanese monetary policy, Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao
(2000) analyze policy reactions in Japan based on the Taylor rule for the period after
1975, and conclude that monetary policy became more responsive to inflation from
the latter half of the 1980s to the first half of the 1990s.
29 However, there have been
no studies analyzing previous periods within this framework.
B. Formulation of the Taylor Rule
Based on Taylor (1998), this study estimates policy reactions based on the Taylor
rule, as calculated by the following formula, using data from 1886, the year after the
BOJ started issuing convertible banknotes, to 1940, the year before the outbreak of
WWII.
i = π + α y + β (π – π
t) +r
f. (1)
Here, i is the short-term money market rate (bill discount rate [average of the Tokyo
Bank Assembly member banks]), π the inflation rate
30 (GNP deflator), and y the 
output gap (divergence rate from the GNP trend), all representing annual data. Of
these, π and y are derived from Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974), and the
Hodrick-Prescott Filter is used to calculate the GNP trend, as Taylor (1998) has
done. Furthermore, π
t is the target inflation rate and r
f the equilibrium real interest
rate. Equation (1) represents the following policy targets: in the long term, to make
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27. Refer to Taylor (1993).
28. Fukai raised two instruments for monetary policy in A Thesis on Monetary Management (1928). They are 
“expansion and contraction of bank notes with fiduciary issue” through loans and government bond operations,
and interest rate policy. Further, he cites three possible monetary policy objectives: maintaining specie reserves,
monetary management to stabilize prices, and alleviation of the severity of business cycles. Fukai’s presentation
demonstrates that at least one policymaker in interwar Japan regarded interest rate operations as a viable policy
instrument and saw the stability of domestic economy (in terms of prices and business conditions) as an objective
of interest rate policies. Thus, it is appropriate to apply the Taylor rule to the analysis of the implementation of
policies. Refer to Fukai (1928, pp. 349–386).
29. However, Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao suggest that this may have destabilized the real economic activity. Refer to
Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000, pp. 138–144).
30. While π should be the expected rate of inflation (implying that the expected rate of inflation should be equal to
the target rate of inflation), Taylor (1993, 1998) uses realized inflation rates, the method followed here. This
assumes that the expected rate of inflation equals the currently realized inflation rate.the short-term market rate equivalent to the sum of the target inflation rate and 
the equilibrium real interest rate; and in the short term, to bring it above long-term
levels when GNP exceeds the trend or the inflation rate exceeds the target inflation
rate temporarily, and conversely, to bring it below long-term levels when GNP 
falls below the trend or the inflation rate drops below the target inflation rate. If 
economic activities are more inflationary than policymakers deem desirable, interest
rates should be raised above long-term target levels; if they are more deflationary,
interest rates should be lowered below the target level. Here, α and β stand for the
sensitivity of policy reactions in the event of divergence from the targets.
Equation (1) is transformed into 
i = (r
f – βπ
t) + (1 + β )π + α y, (2) 
to calculate the constant term of the estimate formula, (r
f – βπ
t), as well as β and α ,
the parameters that indicate policy reactions to inflation rates and output gaps. Here,
in the case of β > –1, it is implied that the interest rate moves in the same direction
as the inflation rate; in the case of β < 0, the real interest rate moves in the direction
opposite of inflation rates. In the case of β > 0, the interest rate moves more than is
required to offset the fluctuation of the inflation rate. That is, the policy reaction is
to raise the real interest rate when the inflation rate rises, and conversely, to lower the
real interest rate when the inflation rate falls. In this case, a counter-cyclical policy is
adopted as long as the inflation rate is regarded as a yardstick. α indicates the policy
response to output gaps. As α approaches zero, interest rates react almost exclusively
to inflation rates.
Figure 4 indicates the historical development of the output gap and the GNP
deflator used in this study. Output gaps show a series of swings. Most evident among
these are a downturn in the first half of the 1910s (the repercussive depression after
the Russo-Japanese War), an upturn in the latter half of the 1910s through the early
1920s (the WWI boom), and a decline in the early 1930s (the lifting of the gold
embargo). The inflation in GNP deflators indicates conspicuous increases in the 
latter half of the 1910s through the early 1920s (the WWI boom).
C. Results of Empirical Analyses and Their Interpretations
The estimated results are summarized in Table 3.
31 β indicates a negative reaction to
inflation rates and is statistically significant in all periods, indicating that policy
responses had been pro-cyclical in relation to the inflation rate throughout the period
covered by the estimate. Further, α indicates that the reaction to the output gap is
positive but not significant, except for the period of the Takahashi Economic Policy
and the following period (1932–40), during which α is negative and significant.
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31. The estimate is made by the two-stage least-squares method, with the one-period lagged explanatory variable as
the instrument variable.96 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002
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Note: Output gap represents a divergence from the trend value calculated by applying
the HP filter (λ = 100) to the data from 1885 to 1940.
Source: Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974).To examine this point more closely, this study has conducted a rolling estimate for
a selected 10-year sub-sample period,
32 to observe changes in the coefficients and 
statistical significance. The results are summarized in Table 4; with the shaded areas
indicating significant results (10 percent level). The results show that β , the inflation
rate coefficient, was negative and significant for most of the sub-sample periods. 
But they also show that there are periods in which the coefficient is consistently not
significant (where it is not possible statistically to reject the possibility that β equals
zero) from the latter half of the 1890s to the 1900s, roughly corresponding to the
period during which the gold standard system was adopted. α , the output gap 
coefficient, is not significant for most of the sub-sample periods, while it is positive
and significant for the periods 1912–21, 1913–22, and 1914–23, and negative and
significant for the periods 1930–39 and 1931–40.
Figure 5 summarizes the relationship between the rolling estimate results and the
real GNP/GNP deflator for the corresponding 10-year sub-sample period. First, the
values of the constant term (r
f – βπ
t) vacillate between five and 10.
33 If one assumes
that the real GNP trend (10-year average of annual percentage change) equals the
equilibrium real interest rate (represented as r
f ), we can derive π
t, the target inflation
rate. In this study, π
t is estimated to go up toward the 1900s (ca. 1898–1907) and
down toward the 1910s (ca. 1910–19), with some outlying data. Then it is flat until
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Table 3  Results of Regression Analyses
Estimate formula: i = (r
f – βπ





1887–1940 8.598 –1.142 0.532 –0.947
(9.26)*** (–5.68)*** (1.01)
1887–1931 9.017  –1.128 0.586  –1.841 
(9.18)*** (–4.88)*** (0.92)
1932–40 5.598  –1.037  –0.293 0.689 
(13.37)*** (–16.15)*** (–1.97)**
(Reference)
1970–2000 2.891  –0.281  –0.456 0.456 
(4.77)*** (–2.01)** (–1.51)
1975–85 6.549  –0.549 1.483  –0.974 
(2.00)* (–0.91) (1.22)
1986–2000 1.892 1.193  –0.567 0.533 
(3.76)*** (2.32)** (–1.54)
Notes: 1. Parentheses represent t-values. * represents 10 percent significance, ** represents 5 percent
significance, and  *** represents 1 percent significance.
2. R
2 values represent figures after adjustments for degrees of freedom.
3. Estimates are made with the two-stage least-squares method, which utilizes the one-period
lagged explanatory variables as its instrument variables.
4. For the period after WWII, y represents the output gap derived from GDP.
Sources: Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974); Cabinet Office, National Accounts (annual 
editions).
32. To be more specific, estimates are iterated in one-year increments for successive 10-year periods, starting with the
period 1887–96 and ending with the period 1931–40.
33. Figures exceed 10 or fall short of five in some periods, but are statistically insignificant.98 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002
Table 4  Results of Rolling Estimates
Starting year/ending year




1887 1896 8.718 (17.91) –0.855 (–10.45) 0.065 (0.20)
1888 1897 8.407 (14.14) –0.836 (–10.29) 0.152 (0.51)
1889 1898 8.031 (3.95) –0.757 (–2.76) 1.015 (0.66)
1890 1899 7.879 (4.71) –0.758 (–3.30) 0.823 (0.84)
1891 1900 7.914 (5.07) –0.798 (–3.43) 0.850 (0.58)
1892 1901 8.063 (5.49) –0.775 (–1.94) 0.639 (0.21)
1893 1902 7.206 (0.41) –0.812 (–0.44) 2.052 (0.05)
1894 1903 8.063 (0.30) –0.287 (–0.01) –5.028 (–0.02)
1895 1904 8.081 (1.76) –0.734 (–1.52) 0.064 (0.04)
1896 1905 7.409 (1.78) –0.664 (–1.19) 0.465 (0.28)
1897 1906 7.140 (1.35) –0.603 (–0.72) 0.308 (0.15)
1898 1907 6.801 (0.60) –0.441 (–0.20) –0.423 (–0.13)
1899 1908 9.517 (1.99) –1.028 (–0.99) –0.933 (–0.36)
1900 1909 7.516 (1.40) –0.602 (–0.41) –0.598 (–0.15)
1901 1910 7.374 (2.16) –0.586 (–0.59) –0.254 (–0.09)
1902 1911 10.136 (0.76) –1.506 (–0.49) –2.184 (–0.27)
1903 1912 8.487 (2.85) –1.204 (–1.81) –0.848 (–0.62)
1904 1913 7.807 (5.16) –1.067 (–2.98) –0.590 (–0.84)
1905 1914 6.613 (5.81) –0.857 (–4.94) –0.378 (–1.11)
1906 1915 5.131 (1.53) –0.639 (–1.09) –0.636 (–0.83)
1907 1916 1.165 (0.04) 0.372 (0.05) –0.710 (–0.22)
1908 1917 6.502 (4.48) –0.896 (–4.85) –0.054 (–0.16)
1909 1918 6.528 (8.25) –0.972 (–15.05) –0.092 (–0.54)
1910 1919 6.159 (5.17) –0.938 (–9.86) –0.099 (–0.49)
1911 1920 7.811 (4.21) –1.036 (–6.85) 0.172 (0.79)
1912 1921 8.190 (15.56) –1.066 (–28.32) 0.196 (2.10)
1913 1922 8.706 (11.64) –1.114 (–15.83) 0.245 (2.18)
1914 1923 8.869 (10.62) –1.129 (–14.03) 0.279 (1.99)
1915 1924 8.558 (8.65) –1.145 (–10.82) 0.380 (1.40)
1916 1925 8.873 (4.85) –1.216 (–5.40) 0.560 (0.75)
1917 1926 8.229 (1.83) –1.315 (–1.42) 1.074 (0.27)
1918 1927 10.730 (0.91) –0.623 (–0.22) –1.608 (–0.15)
1919 1928 9.217 (6.94) –0.925 (–4.54) –0.211 (–0.26)
1920 1929 7.587 (1.83) –1.058 (–2.04) 1.198 (0.35)
1921 1930 9.133 (2.75) –0.878 (–1.39) –1.040 (–0.22)
1922 1931 6.501 (0.61) –0.870 (–1.56) –1.920 (–0.19)
1923 1932 9.607 (4.38) –0.971 (–3.30) 0.773 (0.77)
1924 1933 8.538 (10.08) –0.885 (–3.87) 0.301 (1.33)
1925 1934 8.235 (4.97) –0.534 (–0.52) –0.041 (–0.05)
1926 1935 7.220 (8.78) –0.877 (–2.89) –0.023 (–0.09)
1927 1936 6.333 (12.58) –0.958 (–3.11) –0.219 (–0.68)
1928 1937 5.974 (18.31) –1.026 (–6.39) –0.183 (–0.76)
1929 1938 5.743 (20.29) –1.058 (–16.78) –0.173 (–1.24)
1930 1939 5.330 (13.39) –0.987 (–13.21) –0.322 (–1.78)
1931 1940 5.163 (8.16) –0.977 (–9.88) –0.361 (–1.49)
Notes: 1. Parentheses represent t-values.
2. Shaded areas represent 10 percent significance.
3. Estimates are made with the two-stage least-squares method that utilizes the one-period
lagged explanatory variables as its instrument variables.
Source: Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974).99
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Source: Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974).the first half of the 1920s (ca. 1917–26), goes up with some fluctuations around
1930 (ca. 1925–34), and goes down from 1931–40.
34 On the other hand, there are
no clear relationships between inflation rate and output gap coefficients (β , α ) with
the standard deviation for the inflation rate, while the standard deviation for the
inflation rate increases for the period encompassing WWI.
To examine whether policy rules were affected by monetary regime changes,
dummy variables corresponding to three different periods are applied. These consist
of dummies for the gold standard system (1898–1917), for the managed floating-rate
system (1918–29), and for the fiat money system (1932–40) to be applied to the
constant term and the two coefficients of equation (2) (there are nine dummies in
total) (Table 5).
35 The results indicate that none of the dummy variables is 
significant for the constant term (r
f – βπ
t), the inflation rate coefficient (β ), or the
output gap coefficient (α ).
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Table 5  Estimates, Including Estimates with Dummy Variables
Estimate formula: i = (r
f – βπ







(dummy 1) (dummy 2) (dummy 3)
Without dummy
8.598 –1.142 0.532 –0.947
(9.26)*** (–5.68)*** (1.01)
With dummy
9.422 –0.898 1.078 –1.000 
(2.41)** (–1.49)* (0.81)
Dummy variable
Gold standard system 0.490  –0.454 –0.596
(0.13) (–0.68) (–0.44)
Managed floating-rate system –0.540  –0.088 –1.071
(–0.11) (–0.11) (–0.58)
Fiat money system –3.448 –0.169 –1.493
(–0.71) (–0.29) (–1.08)
Notes: 1. Parentheses represent t-values.
2. Estimates are made with the two-stage least-squares method, which utilizes the one-period
lagged explanatory variables as its instrument variables.
3. Values of dummy coefficients are as follows.
• Gold standard system: one for 1898–1917, and zero for other years.
• Managed floating-rate system: one for 1918–29, and zero for other years.
• Fiat money system: one for 1932–40, and zero for other years.
4. *** represents 1 percent significance, ** represents 5 percent significance, and * represents
10 percent significance. R
2 values represent figures after adjustments for degrees of freedom.
Source: Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974).
34. (r
f – βπ
t), the constant term of the Taylor rule, changes in accordance with fluctuations in the equilibrium real
interest rate (r
f), the inflation rate coefficient (β ), and the target inflation rate (π
t). From WWI to the postwar
period, it is possible that target inflation rates fluctuated greatly due to significant price fluctuations worldwide.
More specifically, in the 1920s, to lower domestic prices was recognized as a policy objective in preparation for 
a return to the gold standard system at the old par value (entailing an appreciation in exchange rates), and the 
target inflation rate may have been negative. On the other hand, after 1932 the target inflation rate may have
risen due to the departure from the gold standard system. However, estimates obtained in this study are not 
necessarily consistent with these hypotheses.
35. Dummies cover periods other than those before 1897 (i.e., the pre-gold-standard era) and from 1930 to 1931
(when the gold embargo was lifted). In addition to the dummies above, the dummies for WWI (1914–18) and
for the lifting of the gold embargo (1930–31) are examined, but the results are insignificant.For reference, equation (2) was applied for the period from 1970 to 2000, using
the uncollateralized overnight call rate as the interest rate variable (Table 3 cited
above). β , representing the reaction to the inflation rate, is negative and significant 
(5 percent level). Setting aside the period of high inflation after the first oil crisis, this
period is divided into a first stage (1975–85) and a second stage (1986–2000). β is
negative but not significant in the first stage, while it is positive and significant 
(at the 5 percent level) in the latter stage. Additionally, α , the output gap coefficient,
was not significant for the entire period.
36
Taylor (1998) argues that in terms of stabilizing the economy policy should 
stipulate that the real interest rate move up as the inflation rate increases; i.e., 
β > 0.
37 This study indicates that β was consistently negative for the entire period
prior to 1940. According to Taylor’s argument, this study reveals that monetary 
policy in Japan prior to 1940 can be interpreted to be pro-cyclical in terms of its 
relationship to the inflation rate.
This study has also examined whether monetary policies changed over different
periods by utilizing rolling estimates and dummy variables. The results of rolling 
estimates suggest that the value of the constant term changed over different sample
periods; however, dummy variables for different monetary regimes were insignificant.
These findings indicate that no major differences have been detected in monetary
policies in terms of inflation rates and output gaps, despite changes in monetary
regimes from the gold standard system through the managed floating rate system to
the fiat money system. 
D. Expansion of the Taylor Rule
From WWI to the interwar period, Japan’s policy operations were subject to the
maintenance of gold and foreign currency reserves. Thus, policymakers may have
actually considered external factors such as BOP, which have not yet been explored 
as explanatory variables in this study, as policy variables.
38 The expansion of the 
formulation of the Taylor rule will be attempted here by adding explanatory 




t) + (1 + β )π + α y + δ z + γ i*. (3) 
Here, z represents gold and foreign currency reserves (as fractions of GNP) and i* 
represents the short-term interest rate in the United Kingdom (the bill discount rate in
the London market). Based on the issue of the “macroeconomic policy trilemma for an
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36. These results are consistent with the conclusions of Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000). They argue that 
monetary policies approaching pure inflation targeting were implemented in Japan from the latter half of the
1980s to the first half of the 1990s. In any event, we should not evaluate contemporary monetary policy in terms
of flexibility of policy operation only with the analyses of annual data. Annual data are utilized here only to 
compare present and past monetary policies. For recent studies on the Taylor rule as a policy target, refer to
Kimura and Tanemura (2000).
37. Refer to Taylor (1998, pp. 325–326).
38. A discussion of optimal monetary policies in an open economy within the framework of the Taylor rule can be
found, for example, in Clarida, Galì, and Gertler (2001).open economy” discussed in Section III.A, the relationship between these variables and
interest rates may vary between different monetary regimes. For example, under the
gold standard system, which is a fixed-rate system based on free internal and external
capital flows, domestic interest rates are thought to move in accordance with overseas
interest rates. It is thus assumed that γ , representing a coefficient of i*, is positive. 
If the policymakers in Japan paid proper attention to gold and foreign currency
reserves while conducting policies, the sign of δ , which indicates the coefficient of the
gold and foreign currency reserve changes, z, would be negative.
Table 6 summarizes the estimates. The sign conditions proved to be as previously
assumed for both δ (negative), the coefficient of gold and foreign currency reserves, and
γ (positive), the coefficient of overseas interest rates. However, neither is statistically
significant. Estimates adding dummy variables to the respective explanatory variables
have demonstrated that no coefficient of the dummy variables proved significant.
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7.939  –1.165 0.620 –0.100 0.505 –1.313
(5.03)** (–5.37)** (1.03) (–0.48) (1.24)
Notes: 1. Parentheses represent t-values. *** represents 1 percent significance, and ** represents 
5 percent significance.
2. R
– 2 values represent figures after adjustments for degrees of freedom. 
3. Estimates are made with the two-stage least-squares method, which utilizes the one-period
lags of π , y, x, w, z among other explanatory variables, i* (without lag), and the one-period
lagged dependent variables (i ), as its instrument variables.
Sources: Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974); Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1978); Mitchell
(1988).
Addition of gold/foreign currency reserves, and overseas interest rates
Estimate formula: i = (r
f – βπ






6.294  –0.965 0.061 –0.359  –0.094 0.533 0.016
(3.49)** (–5.12)** (0.14) (–0.37) (–0.09) (1.18)
Addition of current account, capital account, and overseas interest rates
Estimate formula: i = (r
f – βπ







1.663  –1.019 0.291  ———— 0.791 0.341
(0.59) (–6.60)** (0.77) (2.89)**
(2)
2.080  –1.039 0.356 –0.050  —— 0.199 0.722 0.167
(0.61) (–5.70)** (0.77) (–0.39) (0.72) (2.13)*
(3)
0.094  –0.966 0.284  —– 0.522  –0.480 0.292  0.862  0.073
(0.02) (–5.29)** (0.74) (–0.52) (–0.43) (0.79) (2.31)*
Addition of the lagged dependent variables
Estimate formula: (1) i = (r
f – βπ
t) + (1+ β )π + α y + ω i –1
(2) i = (r
f – βπ
t) + (1+ β )π + α y + δ z + γ i *+ ω i –1
(3) i = (r
f – βπ
t) + (1+ β )π + α y + λ x + θ w + γ i *+ ω i –1
Estimate period: 1887–1940Next, as indicated in the following formula, in addition to overseas interest rates,
instead of gold and foreign currency reserves (representing stock data), the flow BOP
(current and capital accounts) will be added to the explanatory variables.
i = (r
f – βπ
t) + (1 + β )π + α y + λ x + θ w + γ i*. (4) 
Here, x represents the current account as a fraction of GNP; and w is the capital
account as a fraction of GNP. The signs for λ (the coefficient of the current account
(x)) and θ (the coefficient of the capital account (w)) are assumed to be negative.
The results (in the previously cited Table 6) indicate that the sign conditions have
proven to be as assumed for λ , θ , and γ , though none was statistically significant. In
addition, estimates were made for the respective explanatory variables by adding
dummy variables; none of the dummy variable coefficients proved significant. These
results fail to show conclusively whether external factors, such as BOP and overseas
interest rates, influenced Japan’s monetary policy from the period of the gold 
standard system through the interwar period.
Next, estimates are made by adding the one-period lagged dependent variable (i –l)
to each of the above estimates.
i = (r
f – βπ
t) + (1 + β )π + α y + ω i –l, (5) 
i = (r
f – βπ
t) + (1 + β )π + α y + δ z + γ i*+ ω i–l, (6) 
i = (r
f – βπ
t) + (1 + β )π + α y + λ x + θ w + γ i*+ ω i –l. (7) 
When policymakers attempt to maintain interest rate stability, ω (the coefficient
of i –l) is assumed to be positive. The results (in the previously cited Table 6) indicate
that for all estimates the sign conditions for the lagged dependent variables (i –l)
turned out to be positive and significant, as assumed. Another estimate, made by
adding a dummy variable to each explanatory variable, indicates that no coefficient of
the dummy variable was significant.
More extensive investigation is required from various perspectives of the monetary
policies for the periods in question. For example, while analyses in this study are
based on annual data, using quarterly or monthly data may allow for more detailed
analyses of policies and the mechanisms by which the effects of these policies were
spread. It is also necessary to consider the effects of the transformation in monetary
regimes and other economic conditions on the behavior of private-sector economic
entities. In addition, analyses performed by Taylor indicate β < 0 for the period of
the gold standard system (1897–1914) as well as for the preceding period in the
United States. Although the analysis by Taylor does not cover the interwar period,
new findings are expected from a comparison of the results of this study with the
results of other studies on the interwar situation in the United States, specifically 
during the Great Depression. Furthermore, while the Taylor rule focuses on interest
rates as a policy instrument, various policy means other than interest rates (such as
special loans) were actually implemented during the interwar period covered by this
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the effects of these policies on the economy and their relationship to interest rate
fluctuations should also be analyzed.
V. Concluding Remarks
Observations made in this study indicate that Japan’s monetary policy from the days
of the gold standard to the interwar period were generally pro-cyclical in relation to
the inflation rate, though influenced by the choice of monetary regimes. With respect
to latter point, this study suggests that Japanese monetary policy under the gold 
standard system before WWI sought to maintain exchange rate stability at the cost 
of the stability of the domestic economy. Then, during the 1920s under a kind of
managed floating rate system, policy operations were basically the same as those
under the gold standard system, judging from the perspective of the Taylor rule.
Further, during and after the period of the Takahashi Economic Policy (following 
the departure from the gold standard system), monetary policy was not necessarily
conducted to stabilize the domestic economy (i.e., in a counter-cyclical manner),
which should have been possible under the fiat money system.
The question is why the policies for stabilizing the domestic economy were not
carried out, when monetary policy could have been geared to that objective after 
the departure from the gold standard system. One explanation is the strong and 
persistent pressure for military spending on the fiscal side. But we may also raise the
issue of the difficulty of discretionary monetary policy due to the lack of discipline or
nominal anchor when there exist other structural problems. Shizume (2001) has
raised the point of “market discipline for fiscal policy,” which had worked effectively
under the gold standard system but was lost with the departure from the gold 
standard system. When we look back at the course that led to the hyperinflation after
WWII, we see that no effective disciplinary mechanism was introduced during the
period of the Takahashi Economic Policy and the subsequent periods. Since the gold
standard system as a disciplinary mechanism had more direct influence on monetary
policies than on fiscal policies, the above argument seems of greater significance 
for the conduct of monetary policy. Fukai (1928) commented on the difficulty in 
the conduct of monetary policy under a fiat money system during a time of fervent
arguments for lifting the gold embargo, as follows:
39
Proponents of a fiat money system would argue that if human intelligence
enables monetary management even under the gold standard system, it should
certainly be possible to rely on the same capacity to perform more discre-
tionary monetary management under the fiat money system. However, it is
generally difficult to establish adequate standards for monetary management;
and even if established, it is difficult to maintain them . . . . .
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39. Fukai (1928, pp. 249–250). For a discussion of arguments on the lifting of the gold embargo, refer to Section
II.B above.In particular, the conduct of monetary policies under the present con-
ditions often requires not only the discretion of the parties involved, but also
the consent of the general public. From the perspective of immediate benefits,
an abundant money supply seems to be the best bet both fiscally and economi-
cally; nonetheless, the supply needs to be properly controlled to avoid future
setbacks. It is, however, difficult to obtain the consent of the general public
simply by explaining monetary theories or standards for monetary manage-
ment. An explanation that money should not be issued extravagantly because
it must be backed by a certain amount of gold would immediately convince
people for common-sense reasons. Because of the restrictions derived from the
gold standard, money could be controlled relatively properly and safely. 
Subsequent turns of events seem to have followed the course that Fukai feared;
that is, monetary policies were carried out merely in response to fiscal policy 
requirements, and were not “properly controlled,” making “future setbacks” a 
reality.
40 Still, the analyses conducted in this study are not sufficient to evaluate 
the overall policy operations after the days of the Takahashi Economic Policy. The
author thus suggests the need for deeper analyses of this matter, with due attention to
cases overseas.
Future research should also include analyses of the market structures and 
economic system of Japan behind the conduct of monetary policy from the period of
the gold standard system to the interwar period.
41
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40. Particularly in terms of monetary policy after the days of the Takahashi Economic Policy, the policy objective of
facilitating the smooth issuance of government bonds may make it difficult to raise interest rates flexibly.
41. Some preliminary observations are introduced in Appendix 2.APPENDIX 1: BEHAVIOR OF MONETARY INDICATORS
Appendix 1 surveys movements of monetary indicators in Japan from the days of 
the gold standard system through the interwar period. 
Movements of the credit multiplier (various money quantity indices/high-powered
money)
42 and Marshallian k (inverse of velocity; M2/nominal GNP) indicate that the
M2
43 credit multiplier was on the rise from the 1890s to WWI, but that the rising
trend was moderated from 1918 to 1923. After 1924, the increase accelerated.
Although it temporarily subsided in the financial crisis of 1927, it resumed its upward
trend by 1932. Subsequently, the trend leveled off after 1933 (Appendix Figure 1).
Factors affecting the credit multiplier may include (1) deepening financial inter-
mediary functions (enhancing the upward trend of the credit multiplier); (2) interest 
rate behavior (with low interest rates, the credit multiplier will be lower if all other 
conditions remain constant, as the opportunity costs of holding cash are lower); 
(3) changing portfolio structures in financial institutions (e.g., a shift from lending
toward holding of government bonds will lower the credit multiplier); and (4) lowered
credit-creating functions of financial institutions due to credit insecurity (that is, a
lowered credit multiplier), and the like. When the behavior of credit multipliers in the
first half of the 1920s and the latter half of the 1930s is compared, the former indicates
a slowdown of the upward trend of the credit multiplier in an environment of rising
interest rates, while the latter suggests a change from upward movement to a leveling-
off of the credit multiplier in an environment of falling interest rates. This point
should be further analyzed, but may at least suggest that certain malfunctions in the
credit-creating processes of financial institutions in the first half of the 1920s were
moving toward resolution in the latter half of the 1920s. Further, the halt of the
upward trend of the credit multiplier after 1933 may have resulted from behavioral
changes among financial institutions, which increased their holdings of government
bonds, and from low interest rates.
Meanwhile, Marshallian k accelerated its upward trend from the 1920s to the
early 1930s, relative to the 1910s,
44 but declined from 1932 to 1935. While these
developments might also reflect a variety of factors, including the effects of interest
rate fluctuations, it can be surmised that financial intermediary functions changed
qualitatively after 1932.
45
Appendix Figure 2 indicates the historical development of monthly wholesale
prices in Japan and the quantity of notes issued (nominal figures). Appendix Table 1
indicates the dynamic cross-correlation of monthly wholesale prices in Japan and the
quantity of notes issued over the previous year. In order to ascertain the relationship
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42. Estimated from Fujino and Teranishi (2000) and the Committee for Compiling the One-Hundred-Year History
of the Bank of Japan (1986).
43. The total of cash currency, deposit currency, and quasi-money. Estimated from Fujino and Teranishi (2000).
44. Toward the latter half of the 1920s, the reduced opportunity costs of holding money due to lowered interest 
rates might have had a certain influence on Marshallian k (i.e., this may have been a factor pushing Marshallian 
k upward).
45. In this period, interest rates sank significantly below levels in the 1920s. While interest rates seem to have pushed
Marshallian k up, changes in asset management behavior at financial institutions (e.g., an intensified preference
for government bonds) may have had some influence on the downturn in Marshallian k. For more information
on these developments, refer to Shizume (2001).107
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Appendix Figure 1  Credit Multiplier and Marshallian k in Japan
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Appendix Figure 2  Wholesale Prices and Notes Issued in Japan
between prices and quantity of money, it is appropriate to observe the numerical data
including deposit currency. However, as no monthly data are available on deposit 
currency, only the relationship between quantity of notes and prices is noted 
here. Findings include the following: (1) there exists a high correlation between the
fluctuations in wholesale prices and in quantity of notes issued for the entire period;
(2) neither of the fluctuations appears to precede the other (both take place almost
simultaneously) for the entire period; (3) nevertheless, in the period before WWI, 
fluctuations in the quantity of notes issued preceded corresponding changes in 
wholesale prices by two months; from WWI to the 1920s (when Japan was hit 
by severe price fluctuations), both fluctuations took place almost simultaneously; 
and (4) following the period of the Takahashi Economic Policy, wholesale price 
fluctuations preceded fluctuations in the quantity of notes by nine months. While
there are many more points to be considered concerning the relationship between 
currency-related indices and prices, the fact that prices moved before the quantity of
notes issued following the period of the Takahashi Economic Policy at least suggests
the possibility that certain changes took place in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policies.
46
46. It should be noted that correlation coefficients explain statistical relationships between numerical data, and do
not indicate any cause-and-effect relationship. Furthermore, in order to observe behaviors of economic agents
and changes in market structures behind these behaviors, it is necessary to conduct more detailed analyses,
including analyses of interest rate movements.
Sources: Bank of Japan (1987); Ministry of Finance, Reference Book of
Financial Matters (annual editions).109
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Appendix Table 1  Dynamic Cross-Correlation of Prices and Notes Issued in Japan
Percentage change from the previous year
Year 1893–1938 1893–96 1899–1914 1916–20 1922–28 1930–31 1932–39
Preceding 
price
–12 0.278 0.357  –0.229 0.120  –0.396  –0.047 0.460 
–11 0.301 0.328  –0.219  –0.174  –0.404  –0.022 0.483 
–10 0.345 0.256  –0.182  –0.156  –0.373 0.035 0.518 
–9 0.391 0.219  –0.124  –0.149  –0.340 0.110 0.541 
–8 0.434 0.138  –0.056  –0.116  –0.284 0.166 0.516 
–7 0.462 0.045  0.034  –0.124  –0.226 0.269 0.457 
–6 0.482  –0.146 0.144  –0.125  –0.165 0.358 0.379 
–5 0.509  –0.253 0.268  –0.080  –0.101 0.430 0.314 
–4 0.549  –0.281 0.386 0.039  –0.008 0.500 0.264 
–3 0.595  –0.269 0.492 0.216 0.060 0.632 0.228 
–2 0.646  –0.316 0.597 0.431 0.147 0.750 0.191 
–1 0.689  –0.284 0.693 0.594 0.247 0.824 0.148 
0 0.715  –0.178 0.768 0.696 0.314 0.813 0.109 
1 0.707  –0.107 0.814 0.684 0.313 0.662 0.052 
2 0.661  –0.062 0.827 0.564 0.283 0.507  –0.030 
3 0.612  –0.045 0.808 0.473 0.216 0.433  –0.098 
4 0.563  0.075 0.760 0.394 0.135 0.419  –0.135 
5 0.529  0.119 0.691 0.368 0.094 0.330  –0.150 
6 0.503  0.205 0.623 0.367 0.075 0.203  –0.165 
7 0.473  0.251 0.532 0.361 0.066 0.129  –0.184 
8 0.437  0.276 0.431 0.341 0.042 0.088  –0.181 
9 0.394  0.331 0.326 0.285 0.062 0.084  –0.168 
10 0.340  0.389 0.218 0.193 0.067 0.122  –0.141 
11 0.289  0.387 0.099 0.113 0.076 0.159  –0.101 
12 0.243 0.361  –0.003 0.037 0.099 0.180  –0.087
Preceding 
notes
Note: Shaded areas represent the highest points of correlation.
Sources: Bank of Japan (1987); Ministry of Finance, Reference Book of Financial Matters (annual 
editions).APPENDIX 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERWAR ECONOMY
IN TERMS OF PRICE FLUCTUATIONS AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Appendix 2 makes some preliminary observations, based on preceding studies, on the
relationship between industrial structural adjustments
47 and monetary policies, with
the goal of suggesting future directions for research.
The possibility that relief loans provided by the BOJ in the 1920s accelerated the
“moral hazard” problems of banks and companies and hindered the weeding out of
weaker companies has been pointed out by many researchers, including those affili-
ated with the BOJ at the time.
48 “As a result of efforts to suppress the advance of
depression and to prevent companies from going bankrupt, the business community
in the 1920s remained shrouded by weak and ‘risky’ banks and companies.”
49 Thus,
many observers have commented that monetary relaxation may have played some
role in delaying necessary industrial structural adjustments. In this regard, from a
microeconomic perspective (in terms of industrial competitiveness and industrial
structural changes, for example), the crucial question should be whether adjustments
in resource allocation can be performed smoothly in response to changing economic
environments. Okazaki and Okuno (1993) contend that the basic framework of the
economic system in Japan after WWII was formulated in the period between the
1930s and the 1940s. Behind this view lies the observation that Japan before 
the 1920s had some features of an Anglo-Saxon price-flexible economy.
50
Following is a brief review of the relationship between output gaps and inflation
rates for both the interwar period and for the present, in accordance with Kitamura
(2001). Kitamura (2001) presented a framework for dynamic analyses of price 
fluctuations and economic growth, and classified economic development into four
phases: (1) an inflationary state characterized by the coexistence of price hikes and
high growth; (2) a stagflationary state characterized by the coexistence of price hikes
and an economic downturn; (3) a deflationary state characterized by the coexistence
of decreasing prices and an economic downturn; and (4) a new-economy state 
characterized by the coexistence of decreasing prices and high growth. The results of
the application of these phases to prewar Japan (Appendix Figure 3) reveal that in the
1920s Japan followed the four phases from (1) to (2) to (3) to (4); in 1930–31 (when
Japan lifted the gold embargo), phase (3) appeared; and from the period of the
Takahashi Economic Policy to the following Baba Economic Policy, the economy
moved into phase (1).
51
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47. The term “structural adjustment” often has different meanings when used by different researchers; here, it refers
primarily to the enhancement of industrial competitiveness prompted by major upheavals in the external economic
environment, in addition to corporate departmental adjustments, as indicated by changes in industrial structures
and the like.
48. Refer to Tanaka (1980, pp. 33–37 and pp. 78–79).
49. Nakamura (1989, p. 292).
50. Refer to Sato (1981).
51. While Kitamura (2001) conducts analyses in the two-dimensional framework of price fluctuation rates (vertical axis)
and economic growth (horizontal axis), this study draws two-dimensional graphs of price fluctuation rates (vertical
axis) and output gaps (horizontal axis) used in the Taylor rule analyses. Still, in either case, the basic arguments are
the same. The only noticeable difference may be that the use of output gaps in place of economic growth rates will
make it easier to grasp the situation graphically because the horizontal axis indicates cyclical changes.111
Economic Developments and Monetary Policy Responses in Interwar Japan: Evaluation Based on the Taylor Rule
Appendix Figure 3  Relationship between GNP and Prices in Japan
Source: Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974).
Source: Kitamura (2001).
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–20When a similar graph is drawn to compare postwar conditions in Japan with 
prewar conditions, it is apparent that fluctuations along the vertical axis (prices) are
extremely limited, except for the inflationary period after the first oil crisis.
52 On this
issue, Yoshikawa (1992) states that “regarding the coefficients of variation for real and
nominal wages, these were three to four times more flexible in the prewar days
(1905–38) than in the postwar period (1966–85). Comparing the autocorrelation
coefficients reveals that the persistence of real wages was significantly enhanced after
the Second World War.”
53
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52. Behind these differences, a relationship exists between economic growth rates and labor markets, as represented
by the Phillips curve, as well as between labor market and prices, as observed by Okun’s law. Other factors, 
such as differences in employment practices and social security systems, as well as differences in the behavior of
enterprises and workers, are also involved. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this study.
53. Yoshikawa (1992, pp. 156–157). Yoshikawa writes as follows: “However, the coefficients of variation for 
production indices are almost identical, which raises a significant question about the commonly held belief 
that price rigidity is the most important factor leading to quantity fluctuations.” Still, in order to compare the
interwar economy and the postwar economy, it is necessary to consider the differences in conditions. Under the
international gold standard system before WWI and in the interwar period, Japan was a “small open economy” in
terms of its international standing, while under the Bretton Woods System after WWII, Japan was allowed to
restrict capital movements and was thus somewhat capable of protecting itself against overseas shocks and the
repercussions of the international economy. And there are differences of scale between the shocks experienced by
Japan in each period (where the major shocks included WWI and the Great Depression before WWII). However
price-flexible an economy may be, it will not be capable of avoiding major fluctuations in production quantity if
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